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THE LESSON OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
By ROBERT G. SPIVACK

AS NEVILLE

alighted from his airplane
at Heston airport, returning from Munich, he
waved a scrap of paper on which was written:

n

CHAMBERLAIN

"We regard the agreement signed last night and
the Anglo-German naval agreement as symbolic
of the desires of our two peoples never to go to
war with one another again."
In a prepared statement read to the newsreelmen
Chamberlain boasted that he had won "peace in our
time, peace with honor."
That is the Munich contract. In order to obtain
Herr Hitler's signature Mr. Chamberlain gladly sacrificed Czechoslovakia. In order to obtain Mr. Chamberlain's signature Herr Hitler had only to growl.
From the table-talk at Munich peace was to come.
Men of England acclaimed Chamberlain, as they put
away their faultily constructed gas masks (but did
not destroy them). The people of France cheered
Daladier and the Socialists voted confidence in him.
But most significant were the spontaneous sighs of
relief that went up in Berlin and Rome as the browbeaten citizens of those nations learned that the war,
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for which their desperado leaders were preparIng
them, had not yet come.
Yet within two weeks of the Munich conference
the following results were evident:
1. Hitler spoke at Saarbrucken and acclaimed Mussolini as the only "real friend" Germany has In
Europe.
2. Neville Chamberlain demonstrated his trust In
the words of his estimable colleague beyond the
Rhine by insisting that British rearmament be rushed
as quickly as possible.
3. Hitler openly interfered in British internal
affairs by inferring that the overthrow of Chamberlain and the election of "an Eden, Cooper, or
Churchill" would mean war.
4. President Roosevelt "viewing the even ts in
Europe" finds it necessary to push forw'a rd American
armament to an all-time peak. For this the isolationists have themselves to thank. They prevented the
alternative: international cooperation.
5. In Palestine rebellion has broken out, inspired
by Italian propaganda and German arms. The archimperialists have incited Arabs by appealing to their
anti-imperialist sentiments.
6. Brazil and Germany have withdrawn their
ambassadors as a result of continued Nazi interference
in the internal affairs of the former nation.
7. Cardinal Innitzer was stoned in St. Stephen'S
Cathedral for urging Catholic youths to stand by
their convictions.
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8. The British press and radio have seen fit to
"impose a self-censorship" in discussing Germany.
"It would be senseless, so the contention goes, toantagonize the dictatorships unnecessarily at the
present time," writes Ferdinand Kuhn in The NewYork Times on October 16, "especially since they are
so sensitive to the slightest disparagement fromabroad." Information from London indicates that
Lord Halifax drops a hint here and there when a
newspaper becomes a trifle outspoken. France i~ censoring her radio.
9. Germany and Italy continue to aid General
Franco, notwithstanding a "token witpdrawar' of
troops from Spain. v\Tounded soldiers who probably
could no longer fight, and did not wish to in the first
place, make up the bulk . of those returning home.
10. Japan opens a drive towards Canton, ignoring
"stern warnings" by the British foreign office that
interests of the Empire will be protected. Who is
afraid of big, bad Britain?
THE TASK MADE HARDER

With the loss of Czechoslovakia there can be no
denial of the fact that the cause of freedom has suffered a body blow. Pollyanna-isms have no place in
an appraisal of the situation arising from Munich.
But there is no time now to succumb to the forces of
darkness. Hard as the job has become, the only alternative to continuing the battle is suicide. Those who
prefer that way out may take it; but certainly those
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who are to continue living have no time now for talk
of surrender or for accepting the "inevitability" of
fascism's triumph.
What has happened to Czechoslovakia is a grim
story.
In a Europe which has grown blacker since Mussolini's "march" on Rome and Hitler's assault on
German democracy there stood a beacon named
Czechoslovakia.
A nation, like the United States, consisting of many
peoples, it arose from the ashes of the World War to
blossom forth in twenty years as a full-fledged and
relatively prosperous republic. Inhabited by a hardworking, self-sacrificing, idealistic people, its Germans,
Slovaks, Magyars, Czechs and others lived side by side
with a minimum of difficulty and antagonism. Loftier
than most political leaders of post-war Europe towered Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, statesman, philosopher, democrat, who believed that social problems
would only be solved in a free nation. "The first
President of our nation was the son of a little worker,"
Eduard Benes told this writer, "the second President
is the son of a little peasant," he added proudly.
A simple people, the Czechoslovaks had faith that
by acting decently, observing their pledges, and living
righteously they could withstand all the attacks of
sabre":rattlers outside and demagogues within the
nation. Not so airy-minded that they expected respect
if they were a meek nation, a strong ' and wellequipped army was formed, to defend and not to inS

vade. But the only opportunity for democracy to
survive, Benes told us, was for it courageously to meet
its problems, never to slur over them, and thus make
itself strong. The sensational characteristics of the 'n ew
republic lay not in gay night clubs, nor exciting
politics, but in the cool determination that it had a
job to do, a function to play in society. "You will not
find anything to write about us," Karl Capek once
told John Gunther. But it was in these things that
there was so much to be said. It was an unflinching
will to remain a free people that kept alive their
fight for freedom in the middle ages, through the
Austrian Empire, and finally out of it grew the
republic.
\

CZECHOSLOVAK MINORITIES PROBLEM

Gilbert Murray, in a letter to The Times of London (May 18, 1938), says:
"Up to a short time ago Czechoslovakia was
acknowledged to be both the most successful and
the best governed and conducted of the states
cre<l:ted or emancipated by the Great War. . . .
During the four years in which I was intimately
concerned in the protection of minorities by the
Council of the League [of Nations] I have no hesitation in saying that the minorities in Czechoslovakia were the best treated in Europe, and that
I never found Mr. Benes other than fair-minded
and ready to help. The situation seems to have
deteriorated of late years, owing partly to economic distress, intensified by the German exclu9

sion of Czech goods and partly to the fear inspired
in the ordinary population by the aggressive
policy of the Nazi govemment~
"A sharp distinction should be made between
(a) the honest relief of the Sudeten-Deutsch
grievances, advocated by Jaksch, the German
Social-Democrat leader" and (b) the Nazification
of the Sudeten territory, largely by means of
terrorism, which, whatever Henlein's own wishes
may be, seems to be the ob ject of the German
government.- The first is both desirable in itself
and compatible with the continued existence of
Czechoslovakia, the second is neither."
The total number of Germans living in areas with
a German majority is 2,495,633. These areas are
divided and do not touch upon. each other. Germans
are in the majority of eight different areas unconnected with each other and separated by bands of
territory inhabited by a majority of Czechs or one
of the minorities. Therefore it must be recognized
that the German minority cannot be geographically
divided from the rest of the country. Nevertheless the
Germans have been united on certain minority rights
and have presented them from time to time. Under the constitution adopted in 1920 equal
civil and political rights were guaranteed to all national groups, free use of maternal language in private
and business contacts, in religious life, in the press,
and business meetings. National groups were guaranteed equal cultural and educational facilities. The Electoral Law, adopted at the same time as the
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constitution, granted equal and universal suffrage.
The minorities were allotted numbers of deputies
and senators according to their numerical proportions
in the state; e.g.) the German minority 'was allotted
72 deputies out of the 300 forming the Chamber of
Deputies, and 87 out of the 150 Senators.
THE GERMAN-SPEAKING MINORITY

Since June, 1919, members of the minorities have
been able to take part in, or, if they are in the majority, control the administration of the communes
in 'which they live. Out of a total of 15,734 parishes
and communes in the country, 3,466 have an absolute majority of Germans, and on the basis of propor~ional representation in all of these communes,
administration was exclusively or mainly in German
hands. Out of the 239 district councils in the republic
50 have a German majority, and in the case of the
provincial councils, the Germans were represented ·
according to their numerical strength. Thus, in the
provincial cou ncil of Bohemia, there were 37 Germans out of 120 members.
These councils appointed and controlled their own
police forces except in the large towns; they appointed their own magistrates and officials; they
handled all questions of public health, social services
and relief and supplied the buildings and the materials for the schools.
It is interesting to find that in the large German
11

towns, such as Karlsbad, which have also a large
Czech minori ty, all the officials were German.
The Language ' Law of Czechoslovakia gave the
widest latitude in the use 6f minority tongues In
courts, schools, and all phases of administration.
GERMAN SCHOOLS IN CZECHOSLOVARIA

German-speaking people, while only 22 per cent of
the population, had 35 per cent of the educational
facili ties of the nation. The Germans had a proportionately greater number of elementary, secondary,
teachers' training and technical schools and colleges
than the Czechs themselves. For the school year
1934-35 the schools and pupils were as follows: *
Germ ans Hungarians Poles
Czechs
E lemen tary . . . .. . . ..
807
10,4 17
3,283
90
Number of Pupils . . 1,24 2,486
100,115
2
2
9,737
34 ,4 4
11
Higher Elementary . .
1,4 23
13
443
Number of Pupils . . . 3 28 ,835
60
2,
5
2,695
87,153
Secondary & teachers'
training . . ........
6
83
247
Number of Pupils . . . 99,67 2
28,848
4,15 6
576

In addition the Germans had a university, two
technical colleges and 193 public technical schools.
But the Germans have always been dissatisfied with
the fact that their language has not had the same
*Statistical material prepared by Miss Dorothy McConnell,
Secretary National Women's Committee of the American
League for Peace and Democracy, from reports issued by the
World Committee Against War and Fascism.
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legal standing throughout the country as the Czech
language. Furthermore they have wanted the complete control of the education of German children in
their hands .
. In spite of their complaints, the German population gave no indication of wanting to become a part
of Germany. They are not immigrants from Germany.
They have lived for generations in the towns where
they now live. They were merely interest~d in securing greater rights under the form of government
that they possessed. This feeling was capitalized by
Konrad Henlein soon after the world depression
struck Czechoslovakia.
Czechoslovakia was affected by the depression in
the most distressing manner. Practically all the output of its industry was designed for export. The
German population have always lived in the most
industrialized sections of Czechoslovakia and are the
ones who own and work in the factories to a large
extent. Their distress was further intensified by the
exclusion of Czechoslovakian goods by Germany.
Factories were idle, the number of unemployed grew
rapidly, and the factory owners were thrown into
panic. It was a time of apprehension and a time for
th e Nazi principles of the Sudeten German Party to
find good soil for seed. An "ideology" which had, up
to this time, found few supporters began to be promulgated throughou t the Sudeten area.
Added to the propitiousness of the times for the
growth of the S.D.P. (Sudeten German Party) were
13

the methods of the party under the leadership of
Konrad Henlein. The methods were almost exactly
those employed by Hitler's adherents in the early
days of his rise to power.
HENLEIN'S

NAZI

METHODS

A boycott became extremely effective In the areas
where the S.D.P. was strongest. Non-supporters of
the S.D.P. had not only their places of business boycotted but they were warned to leave their lodgings.
A particularly vehement boycott was carried on
against the many . cooperative societies of workers.
The techniques closely followed the Gennan boycott against the Jews. Cooperative buildings were
placarded. Shopping in cooperative stores was strictly forbidden to members of the S.D.P. Persons shopping in cooperatives were watched and warned by
letters. These petty persecutions probably had more
effect in breaking the morale of many of the cooperative societies than the more violent persecutions.
Other workers' associations were "persuaded" to
. join the S.D.P. and become supporters of it. In one
case-a Hairdressers' Association-a motion was put
to join the S.D.P. The chairman and one of the
members spoke against it. The result was -that a boycott was immediately invoked against them and both
were run out of business. With the economic distress
growing more acute daily it is easy to understand
why there were so many "unanimous" decisions of
workers' associations to join the S.D.P.
14

A man applying for work was always asked if he
were a member of the S.D.P. The S.D.P. member got
the job.
N or did the boycott apply only to workers' associations, stores and individual renters of lodgings. In
Kaaden an order went out from the S.D.P. headquarters that members of the S.D.P. were . not allowed to
give away kitchen waste, generally used for the goats
kept by the poor in the town, unless the poor were
supporters of Henlein!
Combined with the boycott was a very effective
propaganda campaign-usually painting the opportunities of life under the Hitler regime in very glowing colors indeed. Nazi Germany was portrayed as a
government under ·which there was no unemployment
and the wages were high. Some of these propaganda
campaigns over-shot themselves. In one case a group
of Sudeten brick-layers were so impressed with the
stories of Germany that they crossed the border ~ for
work. They returned with the report that while they
had found work they had found working conditions
much worse than in Czechoslovakia. This and other
similar stories made the rounds so that underneath the
propaganda there has always been a touch of skepticism on the part of the Sudeten Germans.
In the early days of the coming to ·power of the Henlein party the Czechoslovakian government did not
interfere. It was alarmed at the growing aggressiveness of the Nazi government across the border. At
the same time it laid 's pecial emphasis on the pro-
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tection of all the rights of the minorities under its
constitution and electoral laws.
Meantime Hitler was arousing his own people to
the "distressing'" plight of their fellow-Germans across
the border. In February, 1938, before his triumphal
march into Austria, he said in a speech in the Reichstag:
"Over ten million Germans live in two of the
states adjoining our frontiers. . . . We cannot
dispute the fact that as long as Germany was
feeble and powerless, she simply had to endure
these persecutions of Germans across her frontiers. Just as England looks after her interests
which cover a large part of the ,,,,orId, so also will
the Germany of today look after her, in comparison, restricted interests. And to these interests of
the German Reich belongs also the protection of
those fellow-Germans who live beyond our frontiers and are unable to ensure for themselves the
right to general freedom, personal, political and
ideological.' ,
The i)urrender of Austria occurred shortly after.
By April Konrad Henlein at the S.D.P. Congress
at Karlsbad declared that no solution of German
minority rights would be acceptable unless it was
based on the following principles:
Full equality of status for Czechs and
Germans.
2. A guarantee for this equality by the recognition of the Sudeten Germans as a legal body incorporate.
1.

3. Determination and legal recognition of the
German areas within the state.
4. Full self-government for the German areas.
5. Legal protection for every citizen living outside the area of his own nationality.
6. Removal of injustices inflicted since 1918
and reparations for damages caused thereby.
7. Recogni tion of the principle: German officials wi thin the German area.
8. Full liberty to profess German nationality
and German political philosophy.
These demands were immediately opposed in the
majority of the Czech papers, which recognized them
not as an attempt to find a satisfactory solution of the
minority problem, but as an attempt to disrupt the
Czechoslovakian government in the interests of Hitler
Germany.
It was agreed by the government that Premier
Hodza, while rejecting Henlein's demands, should
open negotiations with the Sudeten German Party
on modified terms. The Czech coalition parties unanimously expressed their desire to satisfy the demands
of the various minorities, subject only to the sovereignty and integrity of the state and of its 'democratic
structure.
On May 20 Premier Hodza announced that the
government had drafted a complete solution of the
whole minority problem which would cut deeply
into the existing state administration. But the government was determined to fulfill its obligations both
to the coun try and to Europe. Czechoslovakia wished
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to settle the question of the relations between the
various nationalities on her territory in the principles
'Of justice.
On May 22 the first of the municipal elections was
held in Sudeten-German towns and counties. The
elections were held at a time extremely favorable to
the S.D.P. Au stria had been annexed, Germany stood
ready across the border to step in in case any incident
occurred. German propaganda broadcasts were humming across the border continuously.
SUDETENS LOYAL TO CZECH STATE

Until this time there had been no hint of a plebiscite of the German-Sudetens concerning the cession
of their area to Germany. Henlein had said some
time before:
"The welfare of the Sudetens is indissolubly
bound up with the welfare of the Czechoslovak
Republic. We stand in principle and unanimously for loyalty to this state. For more than
a thousand years Germans and Czechs have lived
together in these lands, and always their fate has
been common in times of distress and in times of
prosperity."
Even immediately before the elections there was no
hint of secession by Henlein and his followers. The
Henleinists were attempting to use the elections to
show the international public that the entire SudetenGerman public stood for Henlein. What followed
the elections is now history.
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It was a decent people that Neville Chamberlain
sacrificed. It was a growing, virile, clean young state
that was offered on the altar by the corrupt action of
the Prime Minister of a once "Great" Britain. It is
too . much to expect that two men like Chamberlain
and Daladier, who would betray the interests of their
own nations for selfish class interests, could understand what Czechoslovakia symbolized. Moreover, it
is folly to talk of their "crawling by airplane" to
Hitler. Th@y went as partners.
But the full price of the treachery has not yet been
paid and the pity is that it will not be the Cliveden set
or the 200 families of France who will do the paying.
It will be paid by the peoples of many countries.
The cost to Czechoslovakia has been a dear one.
Not only has Germany received the Sudeten area,
which never was hers and whose people in large part
had no "home in the Reich" to which they wished to
return, but other vultures have quickly come to claim
a portion of the prostrate body. Poland took Teschen.
Hungary is still negotiating with one hand on a gun.
An "autonomous" Slovak state within a state has been
set up by reactionaries who go to Berlin for advice.
The Left political parties are threatened with repression at Hitler's insistence. Thousands of bewildered
emigres from the Sudeten areas do not know in which
direction to tum. With a straight face Sir Neill
Malcolm has asked Prague to care for them. "In the
name of humanitarianism I appeal to you," he told
19

General Syrovy. "Humanitarianism," was the reply,
"that is a strange word."
The hearts of democratic Czechoslovaks are heavy.
Nor is it their voice which says that free Germans
must be returned to the concentration camps. It is '"
not the men of liberty who ask Hitler to "mediate"
the differences with Hungary.
"We wanted to sing with the angels," a Prague
journalist commented, "but now we must howl with
the wolves." Bitter, tired, disillusioned there is no
difficulty in understanding their feelings, yet the
Czechs have known misery before, have often had to
fight for their freedom. They are not yet dead. Fascism
may rule the economic and political life of the nation; Hitler may decide the new borders, but in the
minds of its people the values for which they have
'long struggled are lasting; and to them Eduard
Benes is yet President of Czechoslovakia.
THE PRICE TO BE PAID

The ten items listed earlier show clearly enough
how real the peace of Munich is. There is now evidence to believe that the war scare which occurred
during the last two weeks of September, 1938, was a
phony.
'
When he resigned from his Cabinet post, Alfred
Duff Cooper revealed that Germany was encouraged
in her demands, because at the same time that the
British navy -was being mobilized, words were being
20

poured into the ears of the Reichsfuehrer that it was
all camouflage, that Great Britain did not mean business. A United Press dispatch from Berlin revealed
that Marshal Goering was worried nonetheless because he knew that in a real test of strength Germany
could not stand up against England, France and the
Soviet Union. One German general added: "We
would have to fight in the air, by sea, on the land, and
our own people." Mussolini was ready to play Italy's
historic role as a vacillating ally.
.
But most significant is a dispatch from the Rome
office of the Associated Press on September 15. It met
the censor's approval.
"ROME, September 15 (AP)-Reports that
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had talked
with the Premiers of Italy and France before
meeting Adolph Hitler raised the question tonight
whether four-power talks might develop to ward
off a European war.
"In these circles an attempt to solve the Czechoslovakian crisis through an accord among the
four great European powers seemed possible.
"A usually reliable source said Chamberlain
telephoned Premier Benito M ussolini to determine his attitude before flying to talk with
Hitler at Berchtesgaden."
This item was buried in the midst of more sensational news about war preparations, babies in gas
masks, and Mr. Chamberlain's Nazi salute. But for
those who believed that all the dramatic gestures, the
21

three ai~lane flights to Hitler, the tearful speech in
the House of Commons, interrupted by Sir John
Simon, were spontaneous this should be revealing. In
gangster terminology, which seems appropriate, it was
a frame-up.
But if the British Tories .played a malodorous role
that of the French politicians was no less so. From
evidence that newspapermen are discussing abroad it
appears that behirid the scenes George Bonnet was
doing his best to weaken the resistance of his own
people.
In the first place he is said to have discussed with
Litvinov. the possibility of joint action by the Soviet
Union wi th England and France. Li tvinov assured
him that his nation would stand by its agreements.
But Bonnet returned to the French Cabinet and declared that Litvinov had refused to give commitments.
This occasioned Li tvinov' s brillian t spe~ch in the
League assembly where he made the Soviet position
clear.
At another date Bonnet asked the French general
staff for a report on the Soviet army. While the first
two pages were critical, the remainder of the document was full of high praise. Bonnet is said to have
sent only the first two pages to the Cabinet.
At still another period Bonnet remarked that General Gamelin was afraid o~ the Siegfried line and that
France would be stopped there. Actually Gamelin had
remarked in nearly these words, "We could go through
22

the Siegfried line in three weeks as if it were molasses."
Unexpected developments have already taken
place to plague Great Britain for her part. First the
Irish and then the South Africans demanded plebiscites. Then the German foreign office let a hint drop
that possibly an aerial parity of one British plane for
three German planes would be equalizing the injustices of Versailles! This must have riled the Tory
governmen t, added to the ingra ti tude of the Saarbrucken speech in which Hitler did not even consider
Chamberlain as one of his friends. But they cooked ·
the meal-they must eat it.
The people of France are paying even more and
they know the blackmailers have not yet made their
final demands. Daladier, in fear that the rising indignation of the people would scrap his handiwork, as
it had the Hoare-Laval Pact, has established a semidictatorship. Typical Nazi campaigns against Jews
are in motion in Alsace. Many secrets of the Maginot
line have been divulged to the Germans by the seizure
of the Czech fortifications which are on the same pattern. A strong and willing Czech army has been destroyed. The Franco-Soviet Pact has been scrapped,
l~aving France without any real military ally. The
post-war agreements made with the small nations in
Central Europe are worthless, since "to be a friend
of France is a dangerous thing,'.' as one member of the
Chamber of Deputies puts it.
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DILEMMA OF THE DEMOCRACIES

Without any basis for real or lasting peace, Great
Britain and France have reduced themselves to secondrate powers. When Hitler beckons they must come.
When he scowls they must cringe.
"It is the dilemma of the democracies of Europe
that the very sincerity of their desire for peace
has encouraged the German government to make
full use of the nuisance value of a threat of war,"
The New York Times commented.
What has happened since Munich demonstrates
that what Hitler calls "peace" and what democratic
peoples call "peace" are two different things. What
the democratic peoples have not yet learned is that
the mere absence of war is not peace. What they are
learning is that the gift of Czechoslovakia to fascism
has created more problems than it has solved. By
strengthening those governments which include military conquest as an integral part of their philosophies, war has only been postponed and perhaps made
inevitable.
The first lie to come out of Munich was the thesis
that "permanent peace" had been · established. The
second and more deadly is the notion that the ultimate
tri urn ph of fascism is now assured.
Two more lessons are clear since Munich.
THE LESSON LEARNED

First, and one which we shall do well to remember,
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is that the German people by their demonstration of
relief show that they do not follow the war machinations of their rulers with the blind devotion we are
so often told they practise. In his The Coming Victory
of Democracy, Thomas Mann pleads with his readers
not to do anything which will strengthen the present
masters of the Reich if they really want to help the
German people. The most certain way to help the
German people is by refusing to provide Hitler with
raw materials and credits which he still needs from
abroad. Now more than ever an embargo and boycott
against Germany can be potent. But second, and of
greater importance to Americans, is the other lesson
which Munich has taught.
It became evident rapidly enough that Munich
does not mean peace; and in the Gallup poll published on October 14, 60 per cent of the people of
the United States indicated that they realize this fact.
If this is true, why is it?
The reasons are many and complicated. Yet they
can be simplified. First, in fairness to President Roosevelt-who is being thanked by Mr. Chamberlain with
such malicious intent that it seems like a "kiss of
death" -it must be understood that the four-power
conference at Munich was not what Roosevelt had in
mind when he sent his notes to Hitler and the other
governmental heads. In his second note Roosevelt
made clear that he wanted a conference in "neutral
territory" and with all the countries "particularly interested" present. Whatever Munich is, it is not neu-
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tral territory. One might add without being accused
of bias that Czechoslovakia, at least, was one of the
"particularly interested" parties. One might even go
so far as to suggest that Soviet Russia was as much
concerned as Italy. What happened at Munich was
not the Roosevelt plan.
Yet the idea which the President put forth is worthy
of further serious study and action. For the only
method of stopping the costly, even disastrous trend
in rearmament is by such an attempt of all nations to
discuss and settle disputes under international law.
The President should be urged to go further along
this line.
There is a second point.
From the shabby ' treatment of Czechoslovakia there
has arisen a storm of indig~ation throughout this nation which can now be crystallized into a concrete
program, designed to res tore some order in in tern ational relations. The radio coverage of the recent
events has demonstrated adequately that in this world
there is and cannot be any isolation. Polls of popular
opinion show that the American people are clearly
on the side of the democratic nations. It was a dirty
deal, most people agree.
Very well, what is to be done about it?
Since the Czechoslovakian people were abandoned
the press of this nation has struck an almost unanimous note. Papers so removed from progressive thought
as The New York Herald Tribune have been shocked
and outraged. Dorothy Thompson who "prefers to
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be called a conservative" has seen the issue with unusual clarity. Her columns have ' been brilliant and
bitter. On September 22 she wrote:
"Do you prefer death by dismemberment or
death by the sword-answer 'yes' or 'no.' President '
Benes and .Premier Hodza asked permission to
think a moment and made the shocking proposal
of asking to have the case referred to the Court of
International Justice in the Hague ....
"When Lord Halifax read .of what had happened in Austria it is said that this Christian
gentleman beat his brow and said: 'It is horrible!
Horrible!' I wonder what he is going to say next
week.
"I wonder what the 'British people, one in
mind and conscience' as the London Times so
wittily says, with their righteous feeling towards
minorities are going to do with the hordes of
refugees who will try to trek their way out of
Czechoslovakia, penniless and desperate ... ?
"Great Britain is a great empire and I have no
doubt that with her sympathies for the oppressed '
she will take them all in!
"And I hope that Mrs. Chamberlain will pray
for them to that peculiar Anglo-Saxon God of the
upper classes who, just like the rain, bestows his
favors on the just and unjust, according to ' the
balance of power."
Or in different vein but with the same disgust, the
Portland Oregonian asks:
"Was it necessary for Chamberlain to make a
personal appearance to get the German dictator
to accept exactly what he has been demanding all
27

along? ... Surely a telegram would have served as
well-a telegram well within the ten-word limit.
One reading 'Take what you want' surely would
have prevented the outbreak of war, it being the
intention to capitulate in practically all particulars to German arrogance . . . . "
Even The New York Post which carried two editorials during the crisis saying "Thank God for the
Atlantic Ocean," has seen the simple truth that
Munich has left all the old tensions and merely
created additional problems. But the Post goes on to
draw completely false lessons from the re,suIts, so
false that even its own editorial and news columns
contradict them. After being completely revolted by
the results of the sell-out they also give thanks that
we of the United States have had nothing to do with
it. They conclude that we should now learn to stay
out of Europe's affairs, because they are not our own.
But their deep concern for what has happened
gives the lie to the thesis. The complete triumph of
Hitler on the Czech issue has given encouragement to
,e very sabre-rattler externally and internally. Our
own fascists can say with good reason: "Why bother
arguing with labor around a conference table? Beat
the hell out of strikers, that's the only way to handle
them. After all, those tactics are winning in Europe."
American isolationism, praising heaven for SOlne salt
and water, is the exact counterpart of Chamberlain's
isolationism from the affairs of Czechoslovakia.
The excitement and disillusionment of the crisis
7
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have caused others also to become bewildered, even to
doubt the value of a program of concerted peace
action. Yet what took place between the powers was
the exact opposite of concerted action for peace. Instead it was the natural outgrowth of continued concessions to the aggressors. The long tedious rou tine
was repeated as in China, Ethiopia, Spain and Austria.
Not once did the non-aggressor nations stand firmly
to protect the weaker states, not once did they
apply embargoes against the fascists, nor did they ever
give material aid to the aggrieved. Nor did the U ni ted
States; and to that extent the pious denials of the
Post are meaningless and we become parties to the
crimes by our inactivity.
THE

u. s.

AND CONCERTED PEACE ACTION

This is the lesson of Munich. Had the United
States played an active role, had we translated our
moral indignation into concrete- action, we would be
in a better position to cri ticize the ·Bri tish and French,
but, more important, to have save Czechoslovakia.
With our political and economic strength clearly
against the aggressors the cause of world peace would
unquestionably have been aided. As it has been we
have become dupes of the war-makers who have
momentarily conquered by dividing the non-fascist
states.
What was true before 'C zechoslovakia is even more
true today. Capitulation to the fascists does not. promote peace. The United States cannot stand aloof.
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The basic weakness of the aggressor nations is ttieir
internal economic weakness, and large sections of their
people want a chance to rid themselves of the tyrants
who rule them. It has been the failure of the democratic peoples to insist that their governments recognize these facts which has caused so much to be lost
to sheer bluff.
If these facts are true, then the alternatives are
equally true. Embargo the aggressors. Insist that the
government of the United States take a lead in calling
a halt to the retreat of democracy. Continue the work
for peace, recognizing that it alone is the thing which
Hitler, Mussolini and their satellites fear in the end.
For the moment Czechoslovakia has been lost, but
the people of China and Spain are still heroically
fighting on. They need our help; they must not be
relegated to "howl ,vith the wolves" also. Freedom
is too dear to allow the gloom which followed Munich
to translate itself into defeatism. So long as these
people are determined to resist, we dare not become
resigned. Already Neville Chamberlain has turned
from Prague to Spain. Here is clearly the crux of
the new European situatio.n ; we dare .not fail these
valiant soldiers who fight today that we need not
fight tomorrow.
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